RUMI’S MYSTICAL DOCTRINE

RUMI’S MYSTICAL DOCTRINE

And Its Relevance to Indonesia Context
Dr. Mulyadhi Kartanegara

I. Introduction

Although Rumi has been viewed by scholars as “the most eminent poet whom Persia has produced,” or as “the greatest mystical Poet of Islam,” and whom, according to Prof. Annemarie Schimmel, “no other Islamic poet and mystic is known so well known in the West as he is,” still, in Indonesia, Rumi has not been so well known. Only very recently when some Indonesian scholars translated several Rumi’s original works, especially The Mathnavi and Fihi Ma Fihi, and some secondary works on Rumi by western scholars, such as William Chittick and Annemarie Schimmel, did Indonesians know Rumi better. As for Indonesian scholars, only few scholars who wrote specifically on Rumi and his teachings, and some of them translated Rumi’s works into Indonesian, mostly not directly from Persian.

As one who has once studied Rumi’s teachings, I came to realize that many of his mystical doctrines and practical wisdoms taken from real life are very important for Indonesian people to read and understand and very relevant to the current situation of Indonesia facing many ethnico-religious and political problems. It is for these reasons that I am pleased, here, to present in this seminar some relevant topics: (1) the rehabilitation of Sufi’s image, which has been so negatively conceptualized by some of Indonesians as bid’ah (heresy), escapism and a self-centered search for salvation; (2) The reformulation of the concept of taqdir, which has been so long viewed fatalistically as predestination. Here we expect Rumi to offer a progressive concept of taqdir more suitable to the challenges of the modern ages. (3) the transcendent Unity of religions, needed not only by Indonesians, facing many ethnical and religious problems, but also, I believed, by world society, searching for real solutions for current global crisis and problems, in view to building a globally peaceful and harmonious society. In order to know who Rumi was, however, I would like to present, before these very interesting topics, a glimpse of his life and works.

II. Biographical Sketch

Rumi’s original name was Jalal al-Din Muhammad, but he was later known as Mawlana Jalal al-Din Rumi, or simply Rumi. He was born in Balkh on September 30, 1207 AD. He belonged to a royal family, since his grandfather Jalal al-Din al-Khatibi married ‘Ala’ al-Din Muhammad Khwarizimshah’s daughter, princess Malika-i Jehan, who gave birth to Muhammad Baha’’ al-Din Walad, Rumi’s father. Baha’’ al-Din Walad was of great learning and piety, an eloquent preacher and distinguished professor. He was a Sunni scholar, who held orthodox opinions and exhibited anti-rationalist tendencies.

In about 1219, Baha’’, together with his family and few friends, quietly quit his native city, Balkh, to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, knowing that he would probably never return. The first city he visited was Nishapur, where, according to a legend, he met Farid al-Din ‘Attar, a noted poet, who presented him with a copy of his Asrar-nameh (the Book of Mysteries). He told Baha’’ that his son, Rumi, would soon be kindling fire in all the world’s lovers of God. He was also met by the great Shaykh Shihab al-Din ‘Umar Suhrawardi, another eminent Sufi there.

From Nishapur he went to Baghdad, where he received the tragic news of the siege of Balkh, of its capture, and of its complete destruction by Jengis Khan. In 1220 Baha’; went from Baghdad to Mecca, performed the pilgrimage there, proceeded then to Damascus, and to Malatiya (Melitene). From Malatiya he went to Arzinjan (Armenia), and then to Zaranda, about forty miles south-east of Konya, where he and his family lived for four years. It was here, in city of Zaranda, that Rumi married a young lady by the name of Jawhar Khatun, a daughter of Lala Sharaf al-Din of Samarqand in 1225.

Now, the city where they lived at that time belonged to the Seljuk dynasty. The reigning ruler, ‘Ala’ al-Din Kayqubad, invited Baha’’ and his family to Konya, the capital city of Western Seljuk empire, immediately after having haerd of Baha’’ al-Din’s arrival at Zaranda. Baha’’ al-Din accepted the invitation, and moved with his family to Konya in 1228. Baha’’ was to be an eminent theologian and a great teacher and preacher, and later he became the spiritual guide for the Sultan. It was for this reasons that he was conferred an honorific title “Sultan al-‘Ulama’” (the King of Men of Knowledge). Baha’’ al-Din died here in 1230.

After the death of Baha’’, Rumi took over his father’s position as the advisor to the scholars of Konya and to his father’s disciples. Impressed by his profundity of his knowledge and vastness of his experience, Badr al-Din Gohartash, the Sultan’s teacher, built for Rumi a college called Madrasa-i Khudavandgar, where he taught and preached to the people.

Along with his former teacher, Burhan al-Din’s advice, Rumi continued his education at Aleppo, where he stayed at the Madrasa Halawiya and received further instructions from Kamal al-Din b. Al-‘Adim. From Aleppo Rumi moved to Damascus and lived at the Madrasa Maqdisiya. Here, he met such great figures as Muhy al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi, Sa’ad al-Din al-Hamawi, ‘Uthman al-Rumi, Awhad al-Din al-Kirmani, and Sadr al-Din al-Qunyawi.

In 1236 Rumi came back to Konya and continued to teach at Madrasa-i Khudavandgar, with about 400 students attended his lectures, which in turn won a special attention from kings, prices as well as waziers. For many years Rumi had enjoyed his fame and occupied a highly respected position as a leader and scholar of Islamic sciences in Konya up to the moment when the most decisive event ib his entire life took place: his encounter with a mysterious dervish, Shams al-Din of Tabriz, who came to the city as an old man of sixty in 1244.

So powerful was the enchantment of Sham’s personality that Rumi chose to give up his activities as a professional teacher and preacher, only in order to strengthen his bond with the dervish. For some time they were inseparable. This relationship, however, brought about the anger and envy of Rumi’s disciples, who were entirely cut off from their master’s guidance and conversation. As a result, they assailed “the intruder” with abuse and threats of violence. This unfriendly atmosphere was soon sensed by Shams, and so he left Rumi, after having lived in Konya for sixteen months, for Damascus.

This separation was so painful for Rumi and afflicted his feeling so deeply, so that he sent his son, Sultan Walad to beg Shams to come back to Konya. Rumi was so happy and these two men became so deeply absorbed in their profound conversations so that Rumi’s love for his master increased so dramatically. So what had happened before was to repeat and Rumi’s disciples became angry and jealous again and hated Shams so much. This dangerous situation caused Shams to take refuge one more time in Damascus. But this time he never came back. Rumi finally decided to go to Damascus himself to find his beloved master. He never made it, and finally came back to Konya without Shams.

Soon after he came back from Damascus, Rumi established his own order (tariqa), called Mawlawi, a name taken from the honorary address “Mawlana” (Our Master) which was given by his disciples to their beloved Master, Rumi. Nevertheless, not long after, Rumi’s health deteriorated and he soon became ill. On Sunday December 16, 1273 Mawlana Rumi finally passed away as the sun went down at Konya.

Rumi left for us some great and beautiful works behind. Among them are: (1) Maqalat-i Shams-i Tabriz (The Discourse od Shams of Tabriz), containing some mystical dialogues between Shams al-Din as the master and Rumi as the disciple. (2) Divan-i Shams-i Tabriz (The Mystical Odes of Shams of Tabriz), consisting of about 2,500 mystical odes; (3) his Magnus opus Mathnawi Ma’nawi (The Mathnawi of Jalal al-Din Rumi), a long poem of about 25.000 rhyming couplets, divided into six books; (4) Fihi ma fihi (Discourse of Rumi), the only prose works consists of Rumi’s sayings as taken down by his eldest son, Sultan walad, and finally (5) The Ruba’iyyat (The Quatrains of Rumi), comprising about 1, 600 autentic quatrains. It contains Rumi’s ideas on different themes in Sufism, suach as resignation, selflessness, love, faith, reason and union.

III. The Rehabilitation of Sufi’s Image

Sufism (tasawwuf), as the spiritual aspect of Islam, has long been suspected and misunderstood as fist of all, bid’ah (heresy), which undermines Islam from within and misleads the Umma from the true understanding of Islam. Of course, they have based their suspect on historical information, involving many mysterious utterances (shatahat) from the Sufis. In the past, we have known the most well-known case of al-Hallaj, who was executed for his very famous mystical utterance Ana al-Haqq (I am the creative Truth), meaning I am God. In Indonesia the similar case has also taken place in the case of Shaykh Siti Jenar (the fourteen century mysterious mystic), who was also executed by the council of Walis (Dewan Wali) for the very same reason: his utterance “It is He (God) who becomes one with my existence.” Most of Indonesian modernists, especially those who follow Wahabi movement, do not like Sufism and consider it as a misled doctrine (bid’a) and therefore should be avoided.

Second, tasawwuf has also been misunderstood as escapism, meaning having tendency to “escape from the realities of life by absorbing his mind in entertainment or fantasy.” Of course, this attribution has been related with Sufi’s doctrine of zuhd (asceticism), a doctrine that teaches us not to be so tightly attached to this worldly life (dunya), so that its allurement does not make us forget God, the Creator. While zuhd can be conceived also as a mental act, the critics of Sufism considered it to be the retreat from the physical world, that is from social life, and to live fully a hermit life. Until now, this kind of criticism is still persistent.

The third negative image of Sufism is that tasawwuf is identified with the poverty (faqr) and backwardness. Of course we know, in tasawwuf, the concept of poverty (faqr). But this does not necessarily means material poverty. Instead, this should be understood as the awareness that we, human beings, are poor and needy (faqir); and only God who is self-sufficient (al-Ghani). Still, the critics of Sufism take only its literal meaning and associated Sufism with poverty, backwardness and weakness.

Now, after some reflections of Rumi’s teachings, I fully aware that Rumi can very well rehabilitate, through his teachings and practical wisdoms, the distorted image of Sufism. First, to the accusation that tasawwuf is a bid’ah, Rumi says that tasawwuf is not bid’ah, but indeed the essence of Islamic religion. It is the spirituality of Islam. The Mawlana refers to his Mathnawi as “the roots of the roots of the roots of (Islamic) religion in respect of its unveiling the masteries of attainment to the truth.” As the roots or essence of religion, Sufism cannot naturally be viewed clearly by all people, and hence their misunderstandings thereof. One of the most commonly misunderstood is Abu Mansur al-Hallaj’s utterance, “Ana al-Haqq” (I am the creative Truth) or I am God. This utterance has been for so long misunderstood as Sufi’s arrogance, since he claims to be God or like God. Rumi, however, has his own interpretation of the utterance, and instead of being arrogant, this utterance, according to him, is the expression of humbleness from the Sufi side.

In his Fihi ma Fihi, Rumi states:

This is what is signified by the words Ana al-Haqq, “I am God.” People imagine that this is a presumptuous claim, whereas it is really a presumptuous claim to say Ana al-‘Abd, “I am the slave of God.” And Ana al-Haqq, “I am God” is an expression of great humility.” The man who says Ana al-‘Abd, I am the slave of God” affirms two existence, his own and God’s,” but he who says Ana al-Haqq, “I am God” has made himself non-existent and has given himself up and says “I am God”, i.e. I am naught, He is All; There is no being but God’s.” This is the extreme of humility and self-abasement.

It is clear from this, that only God who has the real existence, not the others, nor even the slave of God.
As for another accusation that Sufism is equal to escapism, this can be easily countered bay the fact, that Rumi, a great Sufi of any age, has lived from the very early of his life in a royal palace at Konya. Far from being a hermit, Rumi lived a normal life, having wives and children. This fact by itself indicates that living a hermit life is not at all an absolute condition to be a Sufi. Rumi, who lived his whole life in a palace, still became a great and famous Sufi. Rumi by this example was actually a very effective critic of the so-called negative Sufism.

Not only did the practical wisdom of his life, but also his calls for “self-assertion” in a social life became a very powerful answer to the all negative impressions of Sufism. According to him, the ultimate bliss cannot be achieved only by one’s self. It should be a common enterprise by working hard in the real lives. Of course, we should admit that most of Sufis did not have a good fortune like Rumi, even some of them lived a very humble life. But also the facts that many Sufi lived a normal life and actively participated both in social-cultural, and even political life.

As for the accusation and negative image of Sufism as identical with weakness and poverty, Rumi can be a very effective answer to it. The fact that he lived in a royal palace, can become a counter-argument for that negative image of Sufism that Sufi is not identical with the feebleness, helplessness or poverty. Except for spiritual poverty – in its positive sense—Rumi did posses everything he needed, goods, family, knowledge, dignity etc. With all these he could show us that Sufi is not identical with poverty, feebleness or some other likeness. Instead, he show us the otherwise. The same negative image of Sufi as a weak man, can also be countered by the imagery Rumi has built for the Sufi. Rumi identifies the real Sufi—the man of God or the perfect man,--with the universal intellect (al-‘aql al-kulli) and the manager or administrator (mudabbir) of the world. To emphasize his spiritual strength, Rumi compares him with a hunting lion, on whom all other beasts depend. Rumi calls the perfect Sufi the qutb (the pole).

Describing this Rumi says:
The Qutb is (like) the lion: and it is his business to hunt: (all) the rest (namely), these people (of the world), eat his leavings.So far as you can, endeavor to satisfy the Qutb, so that you may gain strength and hunt the wild beast.

In other place Rumi also used another imagery for the real Sufi as a falcon, a very strong bird, “which she alone knows the return way to the King.” The imageries he used to describe the real Sufi show us clearly, that a Sufi should be a strong, durable and mighty man, not the opposites such as described by those who misunderstood it. The teachings of Rumi and his practical wisdoms can rehabilitate very well the ill-defined image of Sufism and restore it to its proper and lofty place.

IV. Rumi’s Concept of Taqdir and Fee Choice

Beside the image of Sufism that he rehabilitated, Rumi could also reform the concept of taqdir—together with tawakkul and free will—and updated it, so that it became more suitable to the challanges and demands of the ages. In Indonesia, and I believe, also in many other Muslim countries, taqdir has been commonly conceived as predestination or predeterminism, a view that “everything in this world—including human’s acts—has been predetermined by God. Therefore, our situation is just like that of a puppet, which is entirely depended on the puppet player’s will. In fact, we just undergo everything that has been programmed by God. Only because we do not know what is going to happen in the future that we should strive for our life, but in reality everything has been predetermined by Him. This is, of course, a fatalistic concept of taqdir and human acts, in which there is no place whatsoever for human freedom. People usually say, “we just make a plan, but it is God who really determines the result.”

If we carefully read Rumi’s works, however, we will soon find out that it is this very concept of taqdir that Rumi criticized very decisively, and as an alternative, he offered his own concept, a very progressive one, indeed. To reform the concept of taqdir which has bee so long misunderstood, Rumi felt constraint (1) to refine the concept of tawakkul, conceives as a total surrender to God’s will, (2) to prove logically the existence of human free will or free choice, and (3) to present his own concept of taqdir as “the law of life.” Let us begin with the first on tawakkul. His concept of tawakkul can be seen quite clearly from one of his poem:
The party of beasts said to the Lion: There is no work better than truth in God (tawakkul): What indeed is dearer to God than resignation?

Often do we flee from affliction (only) to (fall into) afflictions: recoil from the snake (only) to (meet) the dragon...‘Yes,’ said the Lion: But the Lord of his servants set a ladder before our feet.’Step by step we must climb towards the roof: to be necessirians here is (to indulge) foolish hopes.You have feet: why do you make yourself out to be lame? You have hands: why do you conceal the fingers (whereby you grasp)?When the master put a spade in the slave’s hand, his object was made known to him (the slave) without (a word falling from his) tongue...

From here, we could see clearly that according to Mawlana Rumi human beings cannot just be idle, without doing anything. Man should, instead, work hard and keep doing something with all the facilities God has given to him, such as hands, feet, senses, reason, mind and heart. Rumi says, “If you are putting trust in God, put trust (in Him) with your work: saw (the seed), then rely upon the Almighty.”

Second effort that Rumi tries to do, in order to reform Sufism, is to prove logically that human beings do have the freedom of Choice or free will. For Rumi, man is indeed free to make his own choice. If he is not free, how can he say, “tomorrow I will do this or I will do that? Why should he feel guilty after having committed an evil act? In addition, if everything was predetermined from beginning to end why does the entire Qur’an full of commands and prohibitions?

Rumi looks upon free will positively as the endeavor to thank God for His beneficence. Frre will is indeed the ‘trust” (amana) that God bestowed upon man, with respect of which man is continually put on trial. As the reflection of God’s attributes, man shares His free will to a certain extent. For, “if none but God has the power of choice, why do you become angry with one who committed an offense (against you)? For Rumi, the anger within us is but a clear demonstration of the existence of a power of choice in man. He argues that even animals can recognize the freedom of choice in man. “If camel-driver goes on striking a camel, Rumi says, “The camel will attack the striker. The camel’s anger is not (directed) against his stick: Therefore, the camel has got some notion od the power of choice (in man).”

After proving the existence of the power of choice in man, Rumi was to offer a very progressive concept of taqdir. For Rumi taqdir does not mean that the fate of individuals was predetermined, but rather that taqdir is the law of life, which will never change.

According Khalifa ‘Abd al-Hakim,
“what is called taqdir, for Rumi, in only another name for the law of life, and obviously no law can be law unless it is free from possibility of change or repeal. It is true, that destiny is immutable, and the law of God cannot be changed. Moreover, the law of God is that if you steal, you and the society you belong shall be exposed to certain consequences: and if you speak the truth, certain beneficial effects will follow. God does not compel anyone to steal, tell lies or speak the truth. Actions proceed from free choice, but their consequences are predetermined.”

With this, Rumi thus able to resolve the problem of taqdir which had troubled the Muslim society, including the people of Indonesia, for very long. He criticize the misleading notion of taqdir held by the Necessitarians (Jabariyya) and substituted for it with a dynamic one.

V. The Transcendent Unity of Religion

The last of Rumi’s idea, which for me is very relevant to the people of Indonesian, facing many ethnic and religious problems, is his conception of the transcendent unity of religion. This idea is very relevant to, and also needed by, a country like Indonesia having so many different ethnicities, cultures, languages, and, above all, religions. Sometimes, this diversity brings about many benefits, but very often also creates many problems and conflicts, such as those happening in several places in Eastern parts of Indonesia, especially in Ambon and in Poso, South Sulawesi.

Like other Sufis, Rumi believes in the transcendent unity of religions and sees that controversies between adherents of religions have occurred because they looked only at the external form of religion and not at its meaning (essence). They were deeply bound with the formal and traditional outlook, which sees other religions in part, and consequently it does not allow a vision of the essential unity of all religions. In his famous story of the elephant in the dark house, Rumi tries to show how narrow-minded people try in vain to describe the essence of their religions.

It is clear, therefore, that as long as we are not able to see the meaning of religion comprehensively and only it narrowly, the disputation will be achieved, according to Rumi, only if we can see the transcendent unity of their ultimate goal.

in his Fihi Ma Fihi, he elaborates further:
I was speaking one day amongst a group of people, and party of non-Muslim was present. In the middle of my address they began to weep and to register emotion and ecstasy.
Someone asked: “what do they understand and what do they know? Only one Muslim in a thousand understands this kind of talk. What did they understand, that they should weep?
The master answered: It is not necessary that they should understand the inner spirit of these words. The root of the matter is the words themselves, and they do understand. After all, every one acknowledge the Oneness of God, that He is the Creator and Provider, that He controls everything, that to Him all thing should return...

Though the ways are various, the goal is one. Do you not see that there are many roads to the Ka’ba? For some the road is from Rum, for some from Syria, for some from Persia, for some from China, for some by sea from India and Yemen. So if you consider the roads, the variety is great and divergence infinite; but when you consider the goal, they are all of one accord and one. The hearts of all are at one upon the Ka’ba. The hearts have one attachment, an ardor and a great love for the Ka’ba, and in that there is no room for contrariety. That attachment is neither infidelity nor faith; that is to say, that attachment is not compound with the various roads which we have mentioned. Once they arrived at the Ka’ba, it is realized that warfare was concerning the road only, and their goal was one.

In other place, Rumi tries to show how religion differ only on the surface. It is only the matter of naming things, not the essence behind the names. And disputation will end only when we gain a comprehensive picture of them.

Four people were given a piece of money.The first was a Persian. He said: “’I will buy with this some angur.’The second was an Arab. He said: ‘No, because I want ‘inab.’The third was a Turk. He said: ‘I don’t want ‘inab, I want uzumThe fourth was a Greek. He said: ‘I want stafil.’
Because they did not know that lay behind the names of things, these four started to fight. The had information but not knowledge.

One man of wisdom present could have reconciled them all, saying: ‘I can fulfill the needs of all of you, with one and the same piece of money.
If you honestly give your trust, your one coin will become as four; and four at odd will become as one united.’Such a man would know that each in his own language wanted the same thing, grapes.

It is there the understanding of the essence of one’s religion which is very important, not just its external form of it. And it is by understanding the essence of religions that the conflicts between them could be reduced or even solved.

Mysticism and Dialogue among Cultures

Mysticism and Dialogue among Cultures

by

Mohammad Fanaei Eshkevari

There is no one single agreed-upon definition of mysticism. Each tradition and school of thought defines mysticism in a specific way. However, we can find important common elements in the thought of all those who speak of mysticism. Sometimes mysticism in its wider sense is used as a synonym for spirituality. Mysticism in its all forms goes beyond the ordinary sensory appearance of the world. It assumes an inner and hidden realm of reality that is larger, wider and more real than the apparent world. The same thing is true for human beings. Mystics try to surpass human appearances, going beyond them to the depth of human reality and seeing dimensions, needs, activities and ideals beyond their counterparts in material everyday life.

Mysticism looks at the world and human beings in a way different from that of normal outlooks (whether they be ordinary, scientific or philosophical), and requires tendencies, behaviors and a way of life that in certain ways is different from ordinary alternatives. Mystics try to bring harmony between the inner aspect of human beings and the inner aspect of the world.

Unifying vision, esoteric tendency, seeking spiritual perfection, love, hope, contentment, tranquility, self-knowledge, optimism, striving for liberation from the slavery of desires, self purification, prayer and contemplation are among the most common elements in most if not all of the mystical traditions.

Mysticism can be divided into two very broad categories: theistic and non-theistic. In theistic mysticism, to which this article refers, the real and original being (the Truth/ al haqq) is God. There is no other independent being. If anything else exists, it must be a manifestation of Him. Any human perfection is due to proximity and connection with God, referred to by some mystics as annihilation into or unity with Him. This can be attained through contemplation, love and purification of heart.

The tendency towards mysticism is a transcultural and trans-religious phenomenon. It is part and parcel of all civilizations, traditions and religions. The effects of mysticism can be seen in various dimensions of human life, such as culture, literature, art, and architecture. Its tremendous effect can also be seen in some individual lives. This kind of spiritual feeling is a general phenomenon. Thus, one may say that the tendency toward a kind of mysticism/spirituality is a genuine and natural impulse in human beings.

A deeper form of this feeling, which appears in specific individuals in specific situations, is called mystical experience. Though mystical experience does not happen to every individual, the experience is a widely recognized phenomenon occurring in all cultures and civilizations with more or less similar characteristics. William James mentions four common distinguishing features of mysticism: ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, and passivity.1

The object of this experience, i.e., the reality that is experienced, is more or less similarly described in various mystical traditions, being called such things as unity, life, infinity, knowledge, greatness, eternity, immateriality, and being beyond human understanding.In theistic religions, particularly the Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), both mystical knowledge/feeling and its object are clearly defined. Mystical knowledge is a kind of inner, immediate and intuitive awareness different from ordinary sensory and intellectual knowledge. The object of this awareness is God and truths related to God. The feeling of dependence to God is imprinted in human nature (fitrah). Knowledge of the deeper layers of the truth and the experience of this reality comes about through the grace of God and the purification of heart only to rare and fortunate individuals.

Despite the common elements of mysticism in the various traditions, the differences between these traditions are also undeniable. For instance, there are real differences between Islamic mysticism and Christian mysticism. The difference between the mysticism of the Abrahamic traditions and Indian mystical traditions is much deeper.

Commonalities among Mystical Traditions

However, the commonalities between the various mystical traditions are overwhelming. One may say that the essence of mysticism is one essence that is manifest everywhere in a variety of ways. It is one face reflected in various mirrors. It is one rain whose water takes different shapes in different containers.2 One and the same experience may be expressed and interpreted in different ways due to differences in culture, religion and mindset. Sometimes these differences are like the disagreements of the group of people who touched an elephant in a dark room and reported it differently.3 Or they are like the quarrels of a group of people over buying the grape that came about due to their ignorance of each other’s languages.4 They say different things, but they want the same thing. Some of their differences are superficial, but their commonality is substantial. Of course, it does not mean that all expressions and interpretations are the same and equally accurate. What is important for us in the issue of dialogue are the profound communalities between the various traditions. At the very least, no mystical tradition encourages animosity, hatred, violence, separation, selfishness, injustice, cruelty and aggression.

We know that one of the greatest tragedies in human life is the suffering inflicted on human beings by human beings. Unfortunately, animosity, cruelty, injustice, aggression, war, occupation, murder, torture, rape, and plunder, etc., are everyday facts of life. No natural disaster such as an earthquake, flood, typhoon, wild animal attack, etc., causes more destruction to humanity than humanity itself. In conflicts those who have more power are victorious. Their logic is that might is right. Ironically it is said that human beings are the only animals blessed with reason, but at times this reason is used to rationalize atrocity.The motives behind these actions are selfishness, self-interest, and achieving more power, wealth or pleasure. Sometimes the root of the problem is ignorance. Differences in beliefs and values do not themselves lead to conflict, but in the soil of ignorance and moral corruption they can be major sources of problems.

Divine prophets through religious teaching about the presence of God, religious laws and regulations, strengthening faith and moral virtues, have tried to educate people and reduce the amount of corruption and conflict. There have also been wise people in different societies who have tried to bring solutions to these problems. They have employed different devices such as ethical principles, law, and social order to control the violators of human rights. Each of these attempts has had its effect on improving the human situation and reducing its suffering.

However, even among civilized people there is always some difficulty in peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding. Dialogue is a way to exchange ideas, promote mutual understanding, solve disputes, and bring closeness of heart and unity, as well as work together to achieve common goals. Dialogue can have different bases, such as common interest, common culture, language, ethnicity, or religion, each of which can help to achieve the goal in a limited way.

What I am emphasizing here is dialogue based on the common human tradition of mystical feeling and awareness. Rarely do individuals lack spiritual feeling, and rarely does a culture or civilization lack a mystical tradition. It seems that spiritual feeling is one of the most fundamental and solid foundations for brotherhood, mutual understanding and unity. From this point of view, the root of understanding and friendship is not in material interests or conventions and contracts, but rather in the deepest layer of the heart and the very essence and reality of humanity. This deep common tendency and experience, love and enthusiasm for one reality and eagerness to connect to it, and feeling of having the same origin and destiny, will cut animosities and conflicts off at the root and strengthen friendship, brotherhood and love.1 Mysticism is a solid ground for attaining human ideals in a variety of ways.

Conflict

Conflicts are rooted in selfishness, and mysticism is against any kind of self-centeredness. The essence of the mystical life is love, which means forgetting the ego and melting into the other. If all people realize that they have the same origin, the same beloved, and the same ideal, and that they are traveling toward the same destination, they will not feel separation and strangeness, let alone animosity.

Conflicts arise out of following selfish desires, whereas all mystical traditions insist on resisting selfish tendencies and being liberated from slavery to them. If both sides in any conflict refrain from following their selfish desires, many conflicts will be solved or dissolved.

Conflict results from setting up differences— multiplicity. It occurs between me and he or she, us and them. Mysticism denies this kind of multiplicity and duality, and provides a unitary vision. This vision makes us one and connects us to one and the same source and origin. It fills all gaps. Conflict comes from ignorance, prejudice, intolerance, and impatience, whereas the fruit of mysticism is insight, tolerance, and patience.5 And finally, conflict only takes place in the absence of truth, beauty and the good, while mystical life is nothing but a search for the truth, beauty and the good.

The project of dialogue on the basis of a common human mystical heritage suggests that we all begin from our common mystical spiritual insights and discover our common spiritual heritage, after which we will realize that all our genuine motivations, needs, values and ideals are the same. We have similar feelings and experiences, similar concerns and attachments, even though we express them differently. We have the same journey and the same destiny, we all reject slavery to desires, we all love God and worship Him, we know that love of God is not separate from the love of neighbor6, and we all follow the same fundamental moral principles. On the basis of these commonalities and similarities we should draw close to each other,7 talk sincerely and in friendship, exchange our insights and experiences, try to solve our problems, correct our misunderstandings, help one another live better lives and walk the path toward salvation and happiness.8 The essence of this dialogue is a mutual call toward God, the source of all being and existence, values and beauties, in a wise and compassionate way.9

Undoubtedly, this kind of dialogue brings us closer together, strengthens our common feelings and experiences, and makes us more united. Then we will see the blessings of the All Merciful and the manifestation of His light in our lives.Through such dialogue we can begin to understand and improve our common experience and begin to see the manifestations of this common tradition in various realms of life—in our thought, morality, science, art, media, economy and politics—as we discover how to bring the essence of spirituality into all dimensions of life.10

Notes

I should thank Laurie and Matthew Pierce for their kindly editorial help and references to the Bible.
1. William James, Varieties of Religious Experience(1907), N.Y.: Penguin Book, 1982, pp. 380–381.
2. “He sends down out of heaven water, and the wadis flow in its measure” (The Holy Qur’an, XIII: 17).
3. As seeing it with the eye was impossible, (each one) was feeling it in the dark with the palm of his hand.The hand of one fell on its trunk: he said, “This creature is like a water-pipe.”The hand of another touched its ear: to him it appeared to be like a fan.Since another handled its leg, he said, “I found the elephant’s shape to be like a pillar.”Another laid his hand on its back: he said, “Truly, this elephant was like a throne.”(Rumi, The Mathnawi, Book Three, translated by R. A. Nicholson).
4. Again Rumi describes:“A certain man gave a dirham to four persons: one of them (a Persian) said, “I will spend this on angur .”The second one was an Arab: he said, “No, I want ‘inab, not angur, O rascal!”The third was a Turk: and he said, “This (money) is mine: I don’t want ‘inab, I want uzum.”The fourth, a Greek, said, “Stop this talk: I want istafil.’These people began fighting in contention with one another, because they were unaware of the hidden meaning of the names. In their folly they smote each other with their fists: they were full of ignorance and empty of knowledge.If a master of the esoteric had been there, a revered and many-languaged man, he would have pacified them;And then he would have said, “With this one dirham I will give all of you what ye wish” (The Mathnawi, Book Two).
5. The Bible states that the fruit of God’s Spirit is love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self control (The Holy Bible, Galatians 5:22–23).
6. Jesus said: “‘You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind.’ This is the great and foremost commandment. The second is like it, ‘You shall love your neighbor as yourself.’” (The Holy Bible, Matthew 22:37–40).
7. The Holy Qur’an says: “Say people of the Book! Come now to a word common between us and you, that serve no one but God. . . .” (III: 64).
8. We should “encourage one another and build up one another . . . live in peace with one another. . . . encourage the fainthearted, help the weak, be patient with everyone” (The Holy Bible, I Thessalonians 5:11–14).
9. Imam ‘Ali in a letter to Malik Ashtar, who was appointed as the governor of Egypt, tells him to treat people kindly, and “do not stand over them like greedy beasts who feel it is enough to devour them, since they are of two kinds, either your brother in religion or one like you in creation” ( Imam ‘Ali Ibn Abi Talib, Nahjul Balaaghah. Maryland: Ahlul-Bayt Assembly, 1996, Letter 53, p.239.)
10. “Call thou to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and good admonition . . .” (The Holy Qur’an, XVI: 125).

Resources for further reading

Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran.New York: Pantheon, 1985.

Mohammad Khatami. Islam, Liberty and Development. Binghamton, NY: Binghamton University, Institute of Global Cultural Studies, 1998.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Sufi Essays. Chicago: KAZI Publications, 1999.

Wright, Robin. The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformationin Iran. New York: Vintage Books, 2000.

Christopher de Bellaigue, In the Rose Garden of the Martyrs. A Mem?oir of Iran. New York: HarperCollins, 2004.
Dr. Mohammad Fanaei Eshkevari is Professor of Islam ic Philosophy and Mysticism at the Imam Khomeini Education and R esearch Institute, Q om, Iran.

Science and Civization in Islam

Science and Civilization in Islam
by Seyyed Hossein Nasr
Introduction.

In the Name of God Most Merciful and Compassionate

The Principles of Islam

The history of science is often regarded today as the progressive accumulation of techniques and the refinement of quantitative methods in the study of Nature. Such a point of view considers the present conception of science to be the only valid one; it therefore judges the sciences of other civilizations in the light of modern science and evaluates them primarily with respect to their "development" with the passage of time. Our aim in this work, however, is not to examine the Islamic sciences from the point of view of modern science and of this "evolutionistic" conception of history; it is, on the contrary, to present certain aspects of the Islamic sciences as seen from the Islamic point of view.
To the Muslim, history is a series of accidents that in no way affect the nontemporal principles of Islam. He is more interested in knowing and "realizing" these principles than in cultivating originality and change as intrinsic virtues. The symbol of Islamic civilization is not a flowing river, but the cube of the Kaaba, the stability of which symbolizes the permanent and immutable character of Islam.
Once the spirit of the Islamic revelation had brought into being, out of the heritage of previous civilizations and through its own genius, the civilization whose manifestations may be called distinctly Islamic, the main interest turned away from change and "adaptation." The arts and sciences came to possess instead a stability and a "crystallization" based on the immutability of the principles from which they had issud forth; it is this stability that is too often mistaken in the West today for stagnation and sterility.
The arts and sciences in Islam are based on the idea of unity, which is the heart of the Muslim revelation. Just as all genuine Islamic art, whether it be the Alhambra or the Paris Mosque, provides the plastic forms through which one can contemplate the Divine Unity manifesting itself in multiplicity, so do all the sciences that can properly be called Islamic reveal the unity of Nature. One might say that the aim of all the Islamic sciences and, more generally speaking, of all the medieval and ancient cosmological sciences is to show the unity and interrelatedness of all that exists, so that, in contemplating the unity of the cosmos, man may be led to the unity of the Divine Principle, of which the unity of Nature is the image.
To understand the Islamic sciences in their essence, therefore, requires an understanding of some of the principles of Islam itself, even though these ideas may be difficult to express in modern terms and strange to readers accustomed to another way of thinking. Yet a statement of these principles is necessary here, insofar as they form the matrix within which the Islamic sciences have meaning, and outside of which any study of them would remain superficial and incomplete.
Islamic civilization as a whole is, like other traditional civilizations, based upon a point of view: the revelation brought by the Prophet Muhammad is the "pure" and simple religion of Adam and Abraham, the restoration of a primordial and fundamental unity. The very word islam means both "submission" and "peace"or "being at one with the Divine Will."
The creed of Islam "there is no divinity other than God and Muhammad is his prophet" summarizes in its simplicity the basic attitude and spirit of Islam. To grasp the essence of Islam, it is enough to recognize that God is one, and that the Prophet, who is the vehicle of revelation and the symbol of all creation, was sent by him. This simplicity of the Islamic revelation further implies a type of religious structure different in many ways from that of Christianity. There is no priesthood as such in Islam. Each Muslim being a "priest" is himself capable of fulfilling all the religious functions of his family and, if necessary, of his community; and the role of the imam, as understood in either Sunni or Shia Islam, does not in any way diminish the sacerdotal function of each believer. The orthodoxy based on this creed is intangible, and therefore not so closely bound to specific formulations of dogmatic theology as in Christianity. There have been, to be sure, sectional fanaticism and even persecution, carried on either by rulers or by exoteric theologians, against such figures as al Hallaj and Suhrawardl. Yet the larger orthodoxy, based on the essential doctrine of unity, has always prevailed and has been able to absorb within the structure of Islam all that is not contradictory to the Muslim creed.
In its universal sense, Islam may be said to have three levels of meaning. All beings in the universe, to begin with, are Muslim, i.e., "surrendered to the Divine Will." (A flower cannot help being a flower; a diamond cannot do other than sparkle. God has made them so; it is theirs to obey.) Secondly, all men who accept with their will the sacred law of the revelation are Muslim in that they surrender their wdl to that law. When 'Uqbah, the Muslim conqueror of North Africa, took leave of his family and mounted his horse for the great adventure which was to lead him through two thousand miles of conquest to the Moroccan shores of the Atlantic, he cried out: "And now, God, take my soul." We can hardly imagine Alexander the Great having such thoughts as he set out eastward to Persia. Yet, as conquerors, the two men were to achieve comparable feats; the "passivity" of 'Uqbah with respect to the Divine Will was to be transmuted into irresistible action in this world.
Finally, we have the level of pure knowledge and understanding. It is that of the contemplative, the gnostic ('arif), the level that has been recognized throughout Islamic history as the highest and most comprehensive. The gnostic is Muslim in that his whole being is surrendered to God; he has no separate individual existence of his own. He is like the birds and the flowers in his yielding to the Creator; like them, like all the other elements of the cosmos, he reflects the Divine Intellect to his own degree. He reflects it actively, however, they passively; his participation is a conscious one. Thus "knowledge" and "science" are defined as basically different frorn mere curiosity and even from analytical speculation. The gnostic is from this point of view "one with Nature"; he understands it "from the inside," he has become in fact the channel of grace for the universe. His islam and the islam of Nature are now counterparts.
The intellective function, so defined, may be difficult for Westerners to grasp. Were it not for the fact that most of the great scientists and mathematicians of Islam operated within this matrix, it might seem so far removed as to be irrelevant to this study. Yet, it is closer in fact to the Western tradition than most modern readers are likely to realize. It is certainly very close to the contemplative strain of the Christian Middle Ages a strain once more evoked in part, during the modern era, by the German school of Naturphilosophie and by the Romantics, who strove for "communion" with Nature. Let us not be misled by words, however. The opening of the Romantic's soul to Nature even Keats's "negative capability" of receiving its imprint is far more a matter of sentiment (or, as they loved to call it then, "sensibility") than of true contemplation, for the truly contemplative attitude is based on "intellection."
We should be mindful here of the changing usage of words. "Intellect" and "intellectual" are so closely identified today with the analytical functions of the mind that they hardly bear any longer any relation to the contemplative. The attitude these words imply toward Nature is the one that Goethe was to deplore as iate as the early nineteenth century that attitude that resolves, conquers, and dominates by force of concepts. It is, in short, essentially abstract, while contemplative knowledge is at bottom concrete. We shall thus have to say, by way of reestablishing the old distinction, that the gnostic's relation to Nature is "intellective," which is neither abstract, nor analytical, nor merely sentimental.
Viewed as a text, Nature is a fabric of symbols, which must be read according to their meaning. The Quran is the counterpart of that text in human words; its verses are called ayat ("signs"), just as are the phenomena of Nature. Both Nature and the Quran speak forth the presence and the worsl~ of God: We shall show them Our portents on the horizon and within themselves until it will be manifest unto them that it is the Truth (41 53).
To the doctors of the Law, this text is merely prescriptive, Nature being present in their minds only as the necessary setting for men's actions. To the gnostic or Sufi, on the other hand, the Quranic text is also symbolic, just as all of Nature is symbolic. If the tradition of the symbolic interpretation of the text of the Sacred Book were to disappear, and the text thereby reduced to its literal meaning, man might still know his duty, but the "cosmic text" would become unintelligible. The phenomena of Nature would lose any connection with the higher orders of reality, as well as among themselves; they would become mere "facts." This is precisely what the intellective capacity and, indeed, Islamic culture as a whole will not accept. The spirit of Islam emphasizes, by contrast, the unity of Nature, that unity that is the aim of the cosmological sciences, and that is adumbrated and prefigured in the continuous interlacing of arabesques uniting the profusion of plant life with the geometric crystals of the verses of the Quran.
Thus we see that the idea of unity is not only the basic presupposition of the Islamic arts and sciences: it dominates their expression as well. The portrayal of any individual object would become a "graven image," a dangerous idol of the mind, the very canon of art in Islam is abstraction. Unity itself is alone deserving of representation; since it is not to be represented directly, however, it can only be symbolized and at that, only by hints. There is no concrete symbol to stand for unity, however; its true expression is negation, not this, not that. Hence, it remains abstract from the point of view of man, who lives in multiplicity.
Thus we come to the central issue. Can our minds grasp the individual object as it stands by itself? or can we do so only by understanding the individual object within the context of the universe? In other words, from the cosmological point of view, is the universe the unity, and the individual event or object a sign (''phenomenon,'' "appearance") of ambiguous and uncertain import? Or is it the other way around? Of these alternatives, which go back to the time of Plato, the Muslim is bound to accept the first -- he gives priority to the universe as the one concrete reality, which symbolizes on the cosmic level the Divine Principle itself, although that cannot truly be envisaged in terms of anything else. This is, to be sure, an ancient choice, but Islam does inherit many of its theories from preexisting traditions, the truths of which it seeks to affirm rather than to deny. What it brings to them, as we have already said, is that strong unitary point of view that, along with a passionate dedication to the Divine Will, enabled Islam to rekindle the flame of science that had been extinguished at Athens and in Alexandria.
We have seen that the sacred art of Islam is an abstract art, combining flexibility of line with emphasis on the archetype, and on the use of regular geometrical figures interlaced with one another. Herein one can already see why mathematics was to make such a strong appeal to the Muslim: its abstract nature furnished the bridge that Muslims were seeking between multiplicity and unity. It provided a fitting texture of symbols for the universe -- symbols that were like keys to open the cosmic text.
We should distinguish at once between the two types of mathematics practiced by Muslims: one was the scrence of algebra, which was always related to geometry and trigonometry; the other was the science of numbers, as understood in the Pythagorean sense. The Pythagorean number has a symbolic as well as a quantitative aspect; it is a projection of Unity, which, however, never leaves its source. Each number has an inherent power of analysis, arising out of its quantitative nature; it has also the power of synthesis because of the inner bond that connects all other numbers to the unit. The Pythagorean number thus has a "personality": it is like a Jacob's ladder, connecting the quantitative with the qualitative domain by virtue of its own inner polarization. To study numbers thus means to contemplate them as symbols and to be led thereby to the intelligible world. So also with the other branches of mathematics. Even where the symbolic aspect is not explicitly stated, the connection with geometric forms has the effect upon the mind of freeing it from dependence upon mere physical appearance, and in that way preparing it for lts iourney into the intelligible world and, ultimately, to Unity.
Gnosis in the Alexandrian world had used, as the vehicle for the expression of its doctrines, a bewildering maze of mythology. In Islam, the intellective symbolism often becomes mathematical, while the direct experience of the mystic is expressed in such powerful poetry as that of Jalal al-Din Rumi. The instrument of gnosis is always, however, the intellect; reason is its passive aspect and its reflection in the human domain. The link between intellect and reason is never broken, except in the individual ventures of a handful of thinkers, among whom there are few that could properly be called scientists. The intellect remains the principle of reason; and the exercise of reason, if it is healthy and normal should naturally lead to the intellect. That is why Muslim metaphysicians say that rational knowledge leads naturally to the affirmation of the Divine Unity. Although the spiritual realities are not merely rational, neither are they irrational Reason, considered in its ultimate rather than its immediate aspect, can bring man to the gateway of the intelligible worldrational knowledge can in the same fashion be integrated into gnosis, even though it is discursive and partial while gnosis is total and intuitive. It is because of this essential relationship of subordination and hierarchy between reason and intellect rational knowledge and gnosis, that the quest for causal explanation in Islam only rarely sought to, and never actually managed to, satisfy itself outside the faith, as was to happen in Christianity at the end of the Middle Ages.
This hierarchy is also based on the belief that scientia -- human knowledge -- is to be regarded as legitimate and noble only so long as it is subordinated to sapientia -- Divine wisdom. Muslim sages would agree with Saint Bonaventure's "Believe, in order to understand." Like him, they insist that scientia can truly exist only in conjunction with sapientia, and that reason is a noble faculty only insofar as it leads to intellection, rather than when it seeks to establish its independence of its own principle, or tries to encompass the Infinite within some finite system. There are in Islamic history one or two instances when rationalist groups did attempt to establish their independence of and opposition to the gnostics, and also to set themselves against other orthodox interpreters of the Islamic revelation. The spiritual forces of Islam were always strong enough, however, to preserve the hierarchy between intellect and reason, and thus to prevent the establishment of a rationalism independent of the revelation. The famous treatises of al-Ghazzali, in the fifth/eleventh century, against the rationalistic philosophers of his time mark the final triumph of intellection overrindependent ratiocination a triumph that did not utterly destroy rationalistic philosophy, but did make it subordinate to gnosis. As a result of this defeat by al-Ghazzali and similar figures of the syllogistic and systematic Aristotelian philosophy in the fifth/eleventh century, the Islamic gnostic tradition has been able to survive and to remain vital down to the present day, instead of being stifled, as elsewhere, in an overly rationalistic atmosphere.
The reaction against the rationalists, of which the wntings of al-Ghazzali mark the high point, coincides roughly in time with the spread of Aristotelianism in the West, which led ultimately to a series of actions and reactionsthe Renaissance, the Reformation, and the Counter-Reformationsuch as never occurred in the Islamic world. In the West, these movements led to new types of philosophy and science such as characterize the Western world today, that are as profoundly different from their medieval antecedents as is the mentaland spiritual horizon of modern man from that of traditional man. Europe in that period began to develop a science of Nature that concerns itself only with the quantitative and material aspects of things, meanwhile, the tide of Islamic thought was flowing back, as before, into its traditional bed, to that conceptual coherence that comprises the mathematical sciences.
Today, as in the past, the traditional Muslim looks upon all of science as "sacred," and studies this sacred science in a well-established threefold articulation. First, within the reach of all, is the Law, contained in essence in the Quran, elucidated by tradition and jurisprudence, and taught by the doctors; it covers every aspect of the social and religious life of the believer. Beyond that lies the Path dealing with the inner aspect of things, which governs the spiritual life of those who have been "elected" to follow it. This has given rise to the various Sufi brotherhoods, since it is actually a way of life built upon communication at a personal, nonsystematic level. Finally, there is the ineffable Truth itself, which lies at the heart of both these approaches.
According to a still-current simile, the Law is as the circumference of a circle, of which the Path is the radius, and the Truth the center. The Path and the Truth together form the esoteric aspect of Islam, to which Sufism is dedicated. At its core lies a metaphysical intuition, knowledge such as comes only to the right "mode in the knower." From this spring a science of the universe, a science of the soul, and the science of mathematics, each of them in essence a different metaphorical setting for that one science that the mind stnves after, each of them a part of that gnosis that comprehends all things.
This may help explain why the mathematician, who was something of a displaced person in the West right up to the late Middle Ages, plays a central role in Islam from the very start. Two centuries after the establishment in the Near East of Christianity (in A.D. 313), the Christian-dominated West was still sunk deep in barbarism. Yet two centuries after Muhammad, the Islamic world under the Caliph Harun al Rashid was already far more active culturally than the contemporaneous world of Charlemagneeven with the latter's earlier start. What reached the West from Islam at that time was little more than dark tales of incredible wealth and wondrous magic. In Islam itself, however, the mathematician's craft, having "found its home," was already able to satisfy the civilized man's desire for logical subtlety and for intellectual games, while philosophy itself reached out into the mysteries beyond reason.
This early stabilization of the theoretical outlook of Islam extended also to the type of man who embodied it. Whereas tke role of intellectual leadership in the West devolved upon several different figures in turnthe Benedictine monk, the scholastic doctor, the lay scientisttke central figure in Islamhas remained almost unchanging. He is the haklm, who encompasses within himself some or all of the several aspects of the sage; scholar, medical healer, spiritual guide. If he happens to be a wise merchant too, that also falls into the picture, for he is traditionally an itinerant person. If his achievements in mathematics are extraordinary, he may become a figure like 'Umar Khayyam. It is clear, moreover, that such a man be his name even Avicenna will never be able to develop each of his several attainments in the same fashion as the single-faceted specialist may. Such specialists do exist in Islam, but they remain mostly secondary figures. The sage does not let himself be drawn into the specialist's single-level "mode of knowing," for then he would forfeit the higher knowledge. Intellectual achievement is thus, in a sense, always patterned upon the model of the unattainable complete, that "total thing" that is not found in the Greek tradition. Ptolemy's Syntaxis becomes in the Muslim world the Almagest or Opus Maximumeven as Aristotle is purely and simply al-failasuf (the philosopher).
The title of Avicenna's great treatise, Kitab al-Shifa, which rivals in scope the Aristotelian corpus, means The Book of Healing. As the title implies the work contains the knowledge needed to cure the soul of the disease of ignorance. It is all that is needed for man to understand; it is also as much as any man need know. Newton's work Principia has an obviously far different ring: it means a foundationessentially, a "beginning" rather than a knowledge that is complete and sufficient for man's intellectual needs as the titles of so many medieval Islamic texts imply.
Islam came into the world at the beginning of the seventh century A.D., its initial date (the journey of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina) being 622 A.D.; it had spread over all of the Middle East, North Africa, and Spain, by the end of that same century. Just as the Islamic religion is one of the "middle way," so too did its territory come to occupyin fact, it still occupiesthe "middle belt" of the globe, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In this region, the home of many earlier civilizations, Islam came into contact with a number of sciences which it absorbed, to the extent that these sciences were compatible with its own spirit and were able to provide nourishment for its own characteristic cultural life.
The primordial character of its revelation, and its confidence that it was expressing the Truth at the heart of all revelations, permitted Islam to absorb ideas from many sources, historically alien yet inwardly related to it. This was especially true in regard to the sciences of Nature, because most of the ancient cosmological sciences -- Greek, as well as Chaldean, Persian, Indian, and Chinese -- had sought to express the unity of Nature and were therefore in conformity with the spirit of Islam. Coming into contact with them, the Muslims adopted some elements from eachmost extensively, perhaps, from the Greeks, but also from the Chaldeans, Indians, Persians, and perhaps, in the case of alchemy, even from the Chinese. They united these sciences into a new corpus, which was to grow over the centuries and become part of the Islamic civilization, integrated into the basic structure derived from the Revelation itself.
The lands destined to become parts of the medieval Islamic world -- from Transoxiana to Andalusia -- were consolidated into a new spiritual universe within a single century after the death of the Prophet. The revelation contained in the Quran, and expressed in the sacred language (Arabic), provided the unifying pattern into which many foreign elements became integrated and absorbed, in accordance with the universal spirit of Islam. In the sciences, especially those dealing with Nature, the most important source was the heritage of Greek civilization.
Alexandria, by the first century B.C., had become the center of Greek science and philosophy, as well as the meeting place of Hellenism with Oriental and ancient Egyptian influences, out of which came Hermeticism and Neoplatonism. The Greek heritage, itself to a great extent an assemblage of ancient Mediterranean views, systematized and put into dialectical form by the peculiar discursive power of the Greeks passed from Alexandria to Antioch, and from there to Nisibis and Edessa, by way of the Christian Monophysites and Nestorians. The latter were particularly instrumental in the spreading of Greek learning, chiefly in Syriac translation, to lands as far east as Persia.
In the third century A.D., Shapur I founded Jundishapur at the site of an ancient city near the present Persian city of Ahwaz, as a prisoner-of-war camp, for soldiers captured in the war with Valerian. This camp gradually grew into a metropolis, which became a center of ancient sciences, studied in Greek and Sanskrit and later in Syriac. A school was set up, on the model of those at Alexandria and Antioch, in which medicine, mathematics, astronomy, and logic were taught, mostly from Greek texts translated into Syriac, but also elements of the Indian and Persian sciences were included. This school, which lasted long after the establishment of the Abbasid caliphate, became an important source of ancient learning in the Islamic world.
Aside from those more obvious avenues, there were also lines of communication with more esoteric aspects of the Greek sciences, particularly the Pythagorean school, through the community of Sabaeans of Harran. This religious community traced its origin to the Prophet Idns (the Enoch of the Old Testament), who is also regarded in the Islamic world as the founder of the sciences of the heavens and of philosophy, and who is identified by some with Hermes Trismegistus. The Sabaeans possessed a remarkable knowledge of astronomy, astrology, and mathematics; their doctrines were in many respects similar to those of the Pythagoreans. It was probably they who provided the link between the Hermetic Tradition and certain aspects of the Islamic esoteric doctrines, into which some elements of Hermeticism were integrated.
On the Oriental side the Indian and, to a lesser degree, the Persian sciences came to have an important bearing upon the growth of the sciences in Islam, a bearing far greater than is usually recognized. In zoology, anthropology, and certain aspects of alchemy, as well as, of course, in mathematics and astronomy, the tradition of Indian and Persian sciences was dominant, as can be seen in the Epistles (Rasail) of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwan al-Safa') and the translations of Ibn Muqaffa'. It must be remembered that the words "magic" and Magi are related, and that, according to the legend, the Jews learned alchemy and the science of numbers from the Magi, while in captivity in Babylon.
There are most likely elements of Chinese science in Islam, especially in alchemy, pointing to some early contact between the Muslims and Chinese science. Some have even gone so far as to claimwithout much proof, to be sure -- that the word al-klmiya' from which "alchemy" is derived, is itself an arabization of the classical Chinese word Chin-l which in some dialects is Kim-Ia and means "the gold-making juice." The most important influence from China, however, was to come in later centuries, particularly after the Mongol invasion, and then primarily in the arts and technology.
The totality of the arts and sciences in Islam thus consisted of a synthesis of the ancient sciences of the Mediterranean people, as incorporated and developed by the Greeks, along with certain Oriental elements. The dominant part of this heritage was definitely Graeco-Hellenistic, in translations either from Syriac or from the Greek itself, by such masters of translation as Hunain ibn Ishaq, and Thabit ibn Qurrah. There were numerous translations of Greek authors into Arabic in nearly every domain of knowledge. The ideas and points of views contained in these translations formed a large part of the nutriment which Islam sampled and then assimilated according to its own inner constitution, and the foundation given to it by tke Quranic revelation. In this way there developed, in conjunction with the three basic "dimensions" of the Law, the Path, and the Truth, Islamic schools which were to become an accepted part of Islamic civilization.
With respect to Greek learning itself, Muslims came to distinguish between two different schools, each possessing a distinct type of science: one, the Hermetic-Pythagorean school, was metaphysical in its approach, its sciences of Nature depending upon the symbolic interpretation of phenomena and of mathematics; in the other, the syllogistic-rationalistic school of the followers of Aristotle, the point of view was philosophical rather than metaphysical, and its sciences were therefore aimed at finding the place of things in a rational system, rather than at seeing, through their appearances, their heavenly essences. The first school was regarded as the continuation, in Greek civilization, of the wisdom of the ancient prophets, especially Solomon and Idris; it was therefore considered to be based on divine rather than human knowledge The second school was looked upon, for the most part, as reflecting the best effort the human mind could make to arrive at the truth, an effort of necessity limited by the finite nature of human reason. The first school was to become an integral part of Islam, certain of its cosmological sciences being integrated into some of the branches of Sufism. The second school did have many disciples in the earlier centuries and thus left an influence upon the language of Muslim theology after the seventh/thirteenth century, it lost ground, however and, despite its continuation up to the present day, it has remained a secondary aspect of Islamic intellectual life.
The various levels of reference existing hierarchically within the structure of Islam are presented concisely by a sage who lived in the fifth/eleventh century, and who is probably the one Oriental figure most familiar to the modern Western public: 'Umar Khayyam, mathematician and poet extraordinary. That he should be regarded in the Western world, on the strength of his famous quatrains as a skeptical hedonist is itself a sign of the profound lack of understanding between the two worlds; for he was in reality a sage and a gnostic of high standing. What appears to be lack of concern or agnosticism in his poetry is merely an accepted form of expression, within which he incorporated both the drastic remedy that the gnostic applies to religious hypocrisy, and also the reestablishment of contact with reality. (Late Greeks, such as Aenesidemus, had had recourse to the same skeptical device, and with similar intentions. ) In the following passage from a metaphysical treatise, Khayyam divides the seekers after knowledge into four categories:
(1) The theologians, who become content with disputation .and "satisfying" proofs, and consider this much knowledge of the Creator (excellent is His Name) as sufflcient.
(2) The philosophers and learned men [of Greek inspiration] who use rational arguments and seek to know the laws of logic, and are never content merely with "satisfying" arguments. But they too cannot remain faithful to the conditions of logic, and become helpless with it.
(3) The Ismailis [a branch of Shia Islam] and others who say that the way of knowledge is none other than receiving information from a learned and credible informant; for, in reasoning about the knowledge of the Creator, His Essence and Attributes, there is much difficulty; the reasoning power of the opponents and the intelligent [of those who struggle against the final authority of the revelation, and of those who fully accept it] is stupefied and helpless before it. Therefore, they say, it is better to seek knowledge from the words of a sincere person.
(4) The Sufis, who do not seek knowledge by meditation or discursive thinking, but by purgation of their inner being and the purifying of their dispositions. They cleanse the rational soul of the impurities of nature and bodily form, until it becomes pure substance. It then comes face to face with the spiritual world, so that the forms of that world become truly reflected in it, without doubt or ambiguity.
This is the best of all ways, because none of the perfections of God are kept away from it, and there are no obstacles or veils put before it. Therefore, whatever [ignorance] comes to man is due to the impurity of his nature; if the veil be lifted and the screen and obstacle removed, the truth of things as they are will become manifest. And the Master [the Prophet Muhammad] -- upon whom be peace -- indicated this when he said: "Truly, during the days of your existence, inspirations come from God. Do you not want to follow them?"Tell unto reasoners that, for the lovers of God [gnostics] intuition is guide, not discursive thought.
Here we have, stated authoritatively, the central perspective of Islamic thought, in which the component parts fall naturally into place. Each one is a different mode of knowing. It is puzzling at first sight to find nowhere in it the mathematicians, of whom Khayyam himself was such an eminent example. Notice, however, that the Ismailis correspond quite closely with what in the early Pythagorean school had been the Akusmatikoi, "those who go by what is told them." It should be noticed, also, that the Pythagorean Mathematikoi, the "expounders of the doctrine," will be found both among the philosophers and again among the Sufis, since systematic theory remains helpless without spiritual achievement, which is precisely what mathematics is intended to lead to, by contrast with syllogistic hair-splitting. This is clearly revealed in later sections of the same work in which Khayyam describes himself as both an orthodox Pythagorean and a Sufi.
Here, too, we see the significant contrast with the Greek world. For the Pythagorean doctrines alluded to had become practically extinct there by the time of Aristotle, and were to be taken up again, and at that only after a fashion, in the Hellenistic revival; in Islam, we see them stabilized and restored almost according to their original pattern through the unitary religious idea. Islam was thus able to hand on to the West, to the extent that the latter accepted the Pythagorean tradition, something more coherent, as well as technically more advanced, than the West's own immediate heritage from antiquity.
There are other lines to be found in Khayyam's spectrum. The "atomistic" school of thought which flourished in Islam after the fourth/tenth century, and which in the Western pespective might be supposed to be scientific, he regards as not belonging to science at all, but to theology, for the Ash'arites who represented this school were exactly the sort of " theologians" he described. In the writings of the followers of this school, especially al-Baqillam, who may be considered their outstanding "philosopher of Nature, "the continuity of external forms is broken by an "atomistic" doctrine of time and space, and by the denial of the Aristotelian notion of causality. For the Ash'arites (as also for the Sufis), the world is annihilated and recreated at every moment; the cause of all events is the Creator and not a finite, created agent. A stone falls because God makes it fall, not because of the nature of the stone or because it is impelled by an external force. Whatappears as "Laws of Nature," i.e., the uniformity of sequence of cause and effect, is only a matter of habit, determined by the will of God and given the status of "law" by Him. Miracles, which seem to break the apparent uniformity of natural phenomena, are simply going against the "habit" of Nature; the Arabic word for a supernatural event means literally that which results from "rupture of habit." We are facing here a strict "consequentiality," which has its parallel in Western thought of the seventeenth century. From Descartes to the Occasionalists, the development presents curious similarities.
In the second grouping on Khayyam's list, the "philosophers and learned men," we would find assembled all the famous names of Islamic science. There is a sharp distinction, however, between two schools of "philosophical" thought, both of which profess to be disciples of the Greeks. The first is the Peripatetic school, whose doctrines are a combination of the ideas of Aristotle and of some Neoplatonists. The representative of this school who was closest to Aristotle was Averroes who, paradoxically, had less effect upon the Islamic than upon the Christian world, and should be studied more as a great member of the tradition of Western philosophy than as an integral part of Islamic intellectual life.
The science of Nature cultivated by the Peripatetic school is primarily syllogistic: it seeks to determine the place of each being, in a vast system based upon the philosophy of Aristotle. The best expression of the doctrines of this school appears in Avicenna's early writings. The Book of Healing is the most comprehensive encyclopedia of knowledge ever written by one person, and undoubtedly the most influential Peripatetic work in Islam.The other Islamic school professing to follow the Greeks was much more sympathetic to the Pythagorean-Platonic than to the Aristotelian tradition. This school, which in later centuries came to be called the Illuminatist (ishraqi) school, asserts that it derives its doctrines not only from the Pythagoreans and their followers, but from the ancient Prophets, the Hermetic Tradition, and even from the ancient Zoroastrian sages. The symbolic works of Avicenna, such as Living Son of the Awake (Hayy ibn Yaqzan) are early expressions of the writings of this school. The greatest Illuminatist philosopher, however, is Suhrawardi, who drew his symbolism from all the many sources mentioned above.The sciences of Nature, as well as the mathematics cultivated by certain adherents of this school, are primarily symbolic, and resemble to a great extent the writings of sorne Neoplatonists. Nature becomes for the writers of this school a cosmic crypt from whose confines they must seek to escapeand on their journey through it, they see in its phenomena "signs," which guide them on the road toward final "illumination." Many Illuminatists, particularly those of later centuries, have also been Sufis, who have made use of the eminently initiatic language of the Illuminatist philosophers to describe the journey of the Sufi toward gnosis. Many members of this school, and in general the learned men whom Khayyam mentions, have also been among the group that have cultivated mathematics, astronomy, and medicine; for these learned men took an interest in all the arts and sciences, and helped to keep alive the traditions of learning in those fields, as an integral part of their studies in philosophy.
The Peripatetics were very strong during the fourth/tenth and fifth/eleventh centuries, but their influence weakened during the succeeding period. The Illuminatists, on the other hand, became strong after the sixth/twelfth century and al-Ghazzah's triumph. They have had a continuous tradition down to the present day, chiefly because of the metaphysical (as against rationalistic) emphasis in their doctrines, and also because of the use of their language by certain Sufi masters. One of the greatest exponents of Illuminatist doctrines, as interpreted and modified by the Safavid sage Mulla Sadra, was Hajil Mulla Hadi Sabziwari who died in Persia less than a century ago.
The Ismailis, to whom Khayyam next refers, are a branch of Shia Islam, which was very powerful in his time, and also played a considerable role in the cultivation of the arts and sciences. Ismaili doctrines are fundamentally esoteric, being based on numerical symbolism and the symbolic interpretation of the "cosmic text." The symbolic interpretation of the Quran, which is basic in Shia Islam as well as in Sufism, was made the basis for the symbolic study of Nature. Moreover, such sciences as alchemy and astrology became integrated into their doctrines, and such texts as the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity, and the numerous writings of Jabir ibn Hayyan, the alchemist, were to have their greatest influence upon this group. The development of what has been called "Oriental neo-Pythagoreanism" is found most clearly in the treatises of the Ismailis. They were very much interested in the sciences of Nature; in integrating the rhythms and cycles of Nature with the cycles of history and with the manifestations of various prophets and imams, their works rank among the most important Islamic writings on Nature.
Khayyam mentions, finally, the Sufis or gnostics, the group to which he himself belonged. It may seem surprising that a man so well versed in the arts and sciences of his day should consider the "way of purification" of the Sufis as the best way of acquiring knowledge. His language in this regard, however, is not merely theoretical, it is almost operational: one cleanses and focuses the instrument of perception, i.e., the soul, so that it may see the realities of the spiritual world. Aristotle himself, the great rationalist, had once said that "knowledge is according to the mode of the knower." The gnostic, in employing the "right" mode of knowledge ensures that Intellection takes place in him immediately and intuitively. In this regard, Khayyam's statement becomes clearer when seen in the light of a doctrine that we shall discuss later: the doctrine of the universal man, who is not only the final goal of the spiritual life, but also the archetype of the universe.
To the extent that the gnostic is able to purify himself of his individualistic and particular nature, and thus to identify himself with the universal man within him, to that same extent does he also gain knowledge of the principles of the cosmos, as well as of the Divine realities. For the gnostic, knowledge of Nature is secondary to knowledge of the Divine Principle; yet, because of the rapport between the gnostic and the universe, Nature does play a positive role in guiding him to his ultimate goal. The phenomena of Nature become "transparent" for the gnostic, so that in each event he "sees" the archetype. The symbols of substances -- geometric forms and numerical quantities, colors, and directions -- these and many other such symbols are aspects of the being of things. They increase in their reality -- a reality independent of personal taste or of the individual -- to the extent that the gnostic divorces himself from his individual perspective and limited existence, and identifies himself with Being. For the gnostic, the knowledge of anything in the universe means ultimately knowledge of the relationship between the essence of that particular being and the Divine Intellect, and the knowledge of the ontological relationship between that being and Being itself.
Kayyam's classification did not take into consideration certain writers of great importance, who did not follow any particular school. There are also many Islamic writers, hakims, including Khayyam himself, who possessed a knowledge of several disciplines, and in whom two or more levels of his hierarchy of knowledge may be found. Some of the most outstanding of these men will be discussed in the next chapter.
smuch as the hierarchy of knowledge in Islam, as it has existed historically, has been united by a metaphysical bond much as a vertical axis unites horizontal planes of reference the integration of these diverse views "from above" has been possible. Historically, of course, there have been many conflicts, sometimes disputes leading to violence and occasionally to the death of a writer. Such conflicts are not, however, as elsewhere, between incompatible orthodoxies. They are regarded by most Islamic commentators as due to the lack of a more universal point of view on the part of those who have only embraced a less universal one. Only the gnostic, who sees all things "as they really are," is able to integrate all these views into their principial unity.
Regarded from their own point of view, each of these schools may be said to possess a certain "philosophy of Nature, and, in conformity with it, to cultivate the sciences dealing with the universe. Some of their writings, primarily those of the Peripatetics, were to be translated into Latin to help form that Western scholasticism which was later to give way to seventeenth-century "natural philosophy." Other writings, such as those of the alchemists, were to flourish in the Western world for several centuries, only to wither away in its atmosphere of rationalistic philosophy. There were still other works, especially those of the Sufis and Illuminatists, which were to have an influence on certain Western circles such as that of Dante, and yet for the most part to remain almost unknown in the Western world, down to comparatively recent times.
In this brief introduction, it has been necessary to cover much ground that is unfamiliar and often quite difficult for a Western reader to grasp. But we felt that we had to dispel the common conception of the Muslims as merely Puritan warriors and merchants, whose strange bent for the "subtleties" of algebra and logic somehow also enabled them to become the transmitters of Greek learning to the West. As against that all too current notion, we have tried to present a brief picture of a culture whose spiritual values are inextricably tied up with mathematics and with metaphysics of a high order, and which once again fused the constituent elements of Greek science into a powerful unitary conception, which had an essential influence on the Western world up to the time of the Renaissance.
Strangely enough, it is this latter conception, half unknown at best, and then quickly forgotten in the Wcst, which has remained, up to the present Western impact upon the Islamic world, the major factor in the Islamic perspective determining its attitude toward Nature and the meaning it gives to the sciences of Nature; conversely, it is those very elements of the Islamic sciences, most responsible for providing the tools with which the West began the study of the already secularized Nature of the seventeenth century, that became secondary in the Islamic world itself and had already ceased to occupy the main intellectual efforts of that civilization by the ninth/ fifteenth century.
The Western world has since concentrated its intellectual energies upon the study of the quantitative aspects of things, thus developing a science of Nature, whose all too obvious fruits in the physical domain have won for it the greatest esteem among people everywhere, for most of whom "science" is identified with technology and its applications. Islamic science, by contrast, seeks ultimately to attain such knowledge as will contribute toward the spiritual perfection and deliverance of anyone capable of studying it; thus its fruits are inward and hidden, its values more difficult to discern. To understand it requires placing oneself within its perspective and accepting as legitimate a science of Nature which has a different end, and uses different means, from those of modern science. If it is unjust to identify Western science solely with its material results, it is even more unjust to judge medieval science by its outward "usefulness" alone. However important its uses may have been in calendarial work, in irrigation, in architecture, its ultimate aim has always been to relate the corporeal world to its basic spiritual principle, through the knowledge of those symbols which unite the various orders of reality. It can only be understood, and should only be judged, in terms of its own aims and its own perspectives.

DIALECTICAL MOMENT OF EXPLANATION AND UNCOVERING OF FAITH-REASON RELATION: IN

THE DIALECTICAL MOMENT OF EXPLANATION AND UNCOVERING OF FAITH-REASON RELATION: IN REFERENCE TO MULLA SADRA AND HANS-GEORG GADAMER THOUGHTS

(Paper of presentation in a one-month research seminar “A Project on Faith and Reason in Our Day” on 18 March 2008, hosted by The Center for the Study of Culture and Values, The Catholic University of America, Washington DC, USA)

Husain Heriyanto
(The Director of Research Department of Islamic College for Advanced Studies (ICAS) Jakarta, Indonesia)

A. Introduction: Background and Rationale
1. Conflict and controversy between faith and reason appear more complicated and complex at the present-day. Some causes are the use of unclear concepts and terms, the incorrect identification of the problems, the ignorance of the real meaning of the idea of faith and reason, and the application of inadequate methods and approaches (good intention to overcome the problem is not sufficient; the more important component today is the adequate methods of solution and holistic approach).
2. We incline to be led unconsciously or consciously into a stalemate situation in which we are caught in polarization between two extremities, for example between rationalism (faith based on reason in the term modern thought) and fideism (‘faith-ism’; faith not based on reason), between scientific materialism and ineffable religious experience, between relativistic-skepticism and theological fundamentalism. It is portrayed in brief by Prof. George F. McLean in his paper A Project on Faith and Reason in Our Day that on the one hand, the West has become so secular that it fears the religious inspiration it needs, and on the other hand, religions standing against the secular rationalism should search for ways to live faithfully in modern times.
3. In his Encyclical Letter entitled “Fides Et Ratio” On the Relationship between Faith and Reason, the Pope John Paul II addressed his deep concern with this issue. He criticized modern philosophy yielding results in the development of different fields of knowledge but abandoning the investigation of being. With identifying the modern rationalism as human reason, he pointed out that reason, rather than voicing the human orientation toward truth, has wilted under the weight of so much knowledge and little by little has lost the capacity to lift its gaze to the heights, not daring to rise the truth of being. According to the Pope, this has given rise to different forms of agnosticism and relativism which have led philosophical research to lose its way in the shifting sands of widespread skepticism. It is interesting how the Pope depicted modern philosophy that has tended to pursue issues – existential, hermeneutical or linguistic – but ignoring the radical questions of the truth about personal existence, about being and about God. Accordingly, the Pope appealed philosophy to take its primordial path, which is one of the noblest of human tasks, that is, taking the great responsibility of forming thought and culture in the search for truth.
4. In reference to Islamic teachings and tradition, we find that Islam pays great attention to intellectual knowledge, rational sciences. A lot of verses of the Holy Qur’an and the Prophetic hadis (tradition, sayings) encourage the people to think, to reflect, to contemplate and at the same time to blame those whom do not use the mental or intellectual capacity. The word ‘aql, which is translated as intellect, reason, wisdom, or intelligence occurs 49 times in the Qur’an. ‘Aql in the Qur’an is used as the means by which man is able to recognize the ultimate significance of things besides the appearance of things. ‘Aql was defined in a famous utterance attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) as ‘a light in the heart that distinguishes between truth and falsehood’ (al’aql nurun fi al-qalb yufariqu bain al-haqq wa al-batil). Human intellect and reason has been introduced in Islamic tradition as an inner divine guide and as the internal messenger of Allah, while the Prophet has been introduced as an outer reason and intellect. So, in Islamic tradition, God has provided man with two means of guidance: the internal (‘al-‘aql) and the external (the Prophet). (Inna lil-al-Allahi hujjatain; Hujjaton zahirah wa hujjaton batinah, fa amm al-zahirah fa al-rusul wa al-anbiya’, wa am al-batinah fa al-‘uqul). In relation to the relationship between faith (iman) and reason (‘aql), let us recite the following famous Prophet ‘s saying, “Al-dinu ‘aqlun; laysa al-dinu li man la ‘aqla lahu” (Religion is intellect; One does not have faith until he makes use of reason). We need also to take into account a tradition of the Prophet (pbuh) narrated by Ali bin Abi Thalib: Once Gabriel came to Adam. He brought with him: faith, morality (haya’) and ‘aql (reason) and asked him to choose one of the tree. When he chose ‘aql, the others were told by Gabriel to return to heaven. They said that they were ordered by Allah to accompany ‘aql wherever it remained. This narrative indicates how comprehensive are the notions of intellect in Islam, and how deeply related it is to faith and the moral faculty.
5. Since it will be understandable then, a group of Muslim authorities and scholars responded promptly to the Pope Benedict XVI lecture in Regensburg, Germany (September 2006) in which the Pope addressed his concern with Islamic teaching on God’s transcendence in relation to human rationality. They explained that saying that “for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality” is a simplification which leads to a misunderstanding. God has many Names in Islam, including the Merciful, the Just, the Seeing, the Hearing, the Knowing, the Loving, and the Gentle. In addition, they mentioned that the Islamic tradition is rich in its explorations of the nature of human intelligence and its relation to God’s Nature and His Will, including questions of what is self-evident and what is not. However, the dichotomy between “reason” on one hand and “faith” on the other does not exist in precisely the same form in Islamic thought.The crucial point that we observe is that Muslim scholars, one year later (September 2007), delivered a historical message in relationship between Islam and Christianity, namely, declaration of A Common Word between Us and You. This message and invitation, which is addressed the leaders of all the world’s churches, and indeed to all Christians everywhere, is based on the common ground between Islam and Christianity, i.e., the love of God and the love of the neighbor. It is declared that this common ground is the best basis for future dialogue and understanding. The more essential with which we are concerned now is that the issue of relationship between faith and reason requires three necessary requirements, they are, the use of the criterion of rationality as the common language of all humanity, the inquiry of the meaning of being (epistemological implication of the love of God), and the application what we call a knowledge-based interfaith dialogue (epistemological implication of the love of neighbor)
We see that the item 1, 2, and 5 are contextual framework of our discussion meanwhile the item 3 and 4 are the normative teachings from which we expect to provide a contribution for solution with adequate framework. We are required to provide a broader and proper framework which is able to accommodate these demands and scopes. I shall explain below why I suggest taking the ideas of Mulla Sadra and Hans-Georg Gadamer for this problem.

B. The Importance of Mulla Sadra
1. Deep Investigation on the Meaning of Being
Mulla Sadra investigated deeply into almost the entire corpus of philosophical, theological and mystical Islamic thought. Like his teacher, Mir Damad, he was interested in Ibn Sina’s ontology (the major ontological distinctions between wujud and mahiyyah) and studied Ibn ‘Arab’s theosophy (philosophical-theological mysticism, irfan nadhari). Suhrawardi, Ibn Sina and Ibn ‘Arabi had a notable impact on Mulla Sadra’s thinking and played a significant role in facilitating his ontological turn from the doctrine of the primacy of essence to the primacy of being and in his development of a new ontological system. Henry Corbin said that Mulla Sadra did a revolution in metaphysics, and he called it ‘existential metaphysics” that differs from Aristotelian system. It is also unlike Platonic metaphysical view that nothing exists but ideas or essence. Mulla Sadra believed that nothing is real but existence.
Seyyed Hossein Nasr delineates how Islamic philosophy developed from the history of the quest of post-Avicennan Islamic philosophers for the understanding of being. Unlike Western philosophy that gradually the possibility of the experience of Being nearly disappeared, in the Islamic world philosophy drew closer to the ocean of Being until finally it became the complement of gnosis and its extension in the direction of systematic exposition and analysis. What Nasr says, I think, is in common with the Pope John Paul II concern as we have mentioned above. And here, it is Mulla Sadra who has given the most extensive and systematic exposition of the “philosophy of being” to be found anywhere in Islam, combining the vision of the Gnostics (Sufis) and the logical acumen of the Peripatetics. Nasr points out that Mulla Sadra’s metaphysics, based on the unity, gradation and principiality of being marks the opening of a new chapter in the development of Islamic philosophy and more particularly ontology.
The term ‘experience’ in question of Islamic philosophy, which culminated with Mulla Sadra, is of a spiritual and inward character, including ultimately the experience of Pure Being, the tasting of Reality that is the origin of the sapiental wisdom or hikmah In this regard, with his ‘philosophy of being’ Mulla Sadra helped bridge the concept of God as the Creator and Sustainer of universe to that of His Beneficences that concerns all beings and His Mercy that encompasses all things ( The Holy Qur’an speaks both concepts). Understood metaphysically, this means that God is the source and the only source of the being of all things and that like the rays of the sun, which shine upon all things, being flows from its Divine Origin to existentiate all things. This is what Mulla Sadra calls “sarayan al-wujud” (the flow of being). This idea reminds us to the doctrine of the love of God, as primary common ground of A Common Word between Us and You the above-mentioned. We may say that Mulla Sadra’s ‘philosophy of being’ can provide the ontological-epistemological framework of this historical declaration between Islam and Christianity.
Mulla Sadra’s metaphysics of love is based on the principle of the principiality of existence and gradation of existence. As we know, like some philosophers, he views the ‘good’ and ‘beauty’ the same as existence, since wherever there is existence, non-existence, imperfection, and evil (which all have the same meaning) are not witnessed, and perfection and the ‘good’ are all that flaunt before eyes. The good, perfection, and beauty are three of the existential things that man finds desirable. ‘Beauty’ is the same as absence of defect (the very perfection and good), and, all of them can be covered by a single word: ‘existence’. Existence creates love; wherever there is existence, there is love, too.
In the vanguard of the discussions related to love, Mulla Sadra says, “..In the creation of every existent of any type, God has determined an end and a perfection, and has placed a motivation and enthusiasm in its instinct and essence to push it to obtain that degree of perfection, which is the end of the line of its existence. Such motivation and enthusiasm are called love..”
2. Adequate System of Thought
Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is an independent school of thought, possessing a specific system of its own. He has established a philosophical system which comprises all philosophical problems; so that one can claim that this school, in the light of its basic principles, could efficiently solve even those peripheral problems which might arise in field of philosophy in future. The available documents strongly indicate that, apart from the ancient Illuminationist school, Peripatetic philosophy, and gnosis, no other independent school of philosophy, except for Transcendent Philosophy, has been developed either in the East or the West to possess such universality, all-inclusiveness, and answerability to problems
Mulla Sadra has profoundly benefited from Peripatetic, Ishraqi, theological, and sophist (pre-Socrates) schools of thought and can be said to owe a great part of this knowledge to the masters of these schools. Apart from the Qur’an, the Prophet (p.b.u.h), Imam Ali (As), and the Prophet’s descendants, he has a deep-rooted belief in Muhyaddin, Ibn-Sina, Aristotle, Plotinus, Suhrawardi, Tusi, Sadr al-Din, Qiyath al-Din Dashtaki, Dawani, and pre-Socratic philosophers, particularly Pythagoras and Empedocles. He also agrees with Ghazali’s ideas concerning ethics, and favors Fakhruddin al-Razi’s method of analyzing theological and philosophical problems; nevertheless, he does not consider them as philosophers and refutes their philosophical ideas in many respects. However, in cases where he agrees with their views, he never hesitates to praise them, and, in order to show his confirmation and acceptance of their ideas, he quotes from them verbatim, as if he himself has originally uttered those words.
One of the sources of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is the pre-Socratic history of philosophy. The philosophers of that time mainly consisted of Ishraqi sages, who followed Oriental and Iranian ancient philosophies to a great extent.
Generally speaking, unlike the case with Peripatetic philosophy, Mulla Sadra’s sources of philosophy were not merely confined to the intellect, so that he would ignore other sources such as revelation and inspiration. In the same way, he did not limit himself only to inspiration and illumination, so that, like gnostics and sophists, he would regard the intellect as being incapable of the perception of realities. He even considered revelation as the most important, valid, and reliable source of knowledge, and, as we mentioned previously, he also attached too much importance to what can be learnt from the Qur’an and hadith.
In Mulla Sadra’s perfect system of thought, one can find all significant components and branches of philosophy, which, taken together, comprise a coherent philosophical system. Ontology and the issues related to metaphysics have the greatest share in this regard and, following them, the majority of discussions are related to theology, psychology, eschatology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, and logic, respectively.
These components, although intermixed, are connected to each other according logically, as is necessary for a perfect philosophical system enjoying a high level of coherence and versatility. In this system, ontological issues are employed as the bases for demonstrating other issues.
Mulla Sadra’s epistemological views are presented in a scattered manner under other issues. One can seek them under subjects such as mental existence, psychological qualities and accidents, the unity of the knower and the known, and the unity of the intellect and the intelligible, and synthesize them with each other. Likewise, his ideas about the philosophy of ethics and political philosophy have not been presented in a focused form. Although he has two independent books on formal logic, a great number of logical issues, whose collection could comprise a valuable book on logic and the philosophy of logic, can also be found among his philosophical discussions.
Mulla Sadra attaches great importance to the knowledge of the soul on the basis of the Islamic tradition of ‘know yourself to know God’, and deals with the subject of the soul in almost most of his books. Nevertheless, he devotes almost a quarter of al-Asfar al-arba‘ah to discussions of the soul, and the end of its ontological journey towards the Day of Resurrection, Paradise, and Hell. In addition to some issues that, for various reasons, have been analyzed during other discussions, problems related to eschatology and animate beings’ life after death comprise another important part of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, and have appeared under topics such as psychology and eschatology.
Main ideas of Mulla Sadra’s ontological system:1. The Primacy of Existence (asalat al-wujud) à being is a self-evident concept; univocal meaning (ishtirak ma’nawi) with different references, existents 2. The Unity of Existence (wahdat al-wujud) à “the ocean of being”3. The Gradation of Existence (tasykik al-wujud) à individuation (al-tashakhus) 4. The Trans-substantial Motion (al-harakat al-jawhariyyah) à constant transition of substance and time is the measure of trans-subtantial motion
Main ideas of Mulla Sadra’s epistemological system:1. Division of knowledge into: 1. Knowledge by presence (ilm hudhuri): direct, intuitive, immediate2. Knowledge by correspondence (ilm hushuli): acquired, conceptions2. KBP and KBC are divided into: primary, self-evident and theoretical3. Theoretical knowledge of KBC pertains to: sensation, memory, imagination, estimation (wahm), and ratiocination (ta’aqqul)4. Particular concepts are divided into: sensorial and imaginal5. Universal concepts (intelligibles) are divided into three groups: ‘primary intelligibles’ (whatness concepts), ‘secondary philosophical intelligibles’, and ‘secondary logical intelligibles’.6. Unity of knowledge, the knower, and the known (al-ittihad al-‘aql, al-‘aqil, wal ma’qul) -à to know is to be (al-‘ilm nahwu minal wujud)
We could see now that Mulla Sadra is one of the exceptional philosophers who has graded a lot of sources. He believes that the first basis for accessing truth is the intellect; however, he does not consider it as being capable of solving the subtle problems of metaphysics. Therefore, a philosopher or sage should not stop halfway through seeking the reality and deprive himself from intuition and using prophets’ revelation.
He states that man’s intellect confirms revelation, and revelation completes the intellect. One who has a religion and depends on revelation must accept the role of the intellect in discovering the truth; likewise, one who follows the intellect and wisdom, must confirm and accept revelation. Intuition and illumination can be demonstrated by means of argumentation and reasoning and, as a result, grant universality to personal experiences, exactly in the same way that the hidden principles of nature could be proved by resorting to mathematical laws.
However, one must admit that the power of wisdom is limited, but intuition and love have no boundaries and can aid man in attaining the truth. The vastness and breadth of Mulla Sadra’s domain of views, and the plurality of the origins of his thoughts granted more freedom to him to expand the realm of philosophy. As a result, there is no trace of different types of narrow-mindedness witnessed in other schools of philosophy in his philosophy.
In relation to our issue at the present about the relation faith and reason, we could assert that Mulla Sadra’s thought is one of the most promising candidates that is capable of providing an adequate and proper framework to help clarify all problems related the issue.

C. The Importance of Hans-Georg Gadamer
1. Proceeding the Heidegger’s project in search for the meaning of being

2. Transforming the investigation of meaning of being into cultural and human studies through language as a mode of understanding2. Able to provide the particularity and plurality
.. please read Truth and Method (Hans-Georg Gadamer) and Hermeneutics, Tradition and Contemporary Changes (by George F. McLean)

D. The Core Problem of Faith and Reason is the Problem of Relationship
1. Clarification numerous key concepts and terms in the issue of faith-reason relation
We are required to start clarifying a number of key concepts and terms which are occupied in the discussion on the relationship between faith and reason. When we use the term of ‘faith’, what it means? There are a lot of the meanings of the term ‘faith’, which some of them are contrary to each other. Some scholars say that faith involves a stance toward some claim that is not demonstrable by reason. Thus faith is a kind of attitude of trust or assent involving an act of will or a commitment on the part of believer. Some are more offensive to natural reason. Tertullian, for instance, claimed credo quia absurdum est (“I believe because it is absurd”). But others scholars say that the act of faith consists essentially in knowledge. For Thomas Aquinas, referring to the Ibn Sina’s thought, faith is an intellectual act whose object is truth. Thus it has both a subjective and objective aspect.
Likewise, when we are talking about the term ‘reason’, what it means. In general sense reason is understood as the principles for a methodological inquiry, whether intellectual, moral, aesthetic, or religious. Thus it is not simply the rules of logical inference. But Nietzsche, for instance, gave a succinct definition of rationality, ie., it is a matrix of connections, which assigns cause to effect. Then he argued that rationality is an inescapable consequence of what he calls man’s ‘will to power’. Here, the term of reason has been reduced into limited scope. He thus excludes all other forms of intellectual inquiries and rational speculations. So, he came to draw conclusion on the limited scope of rationality based on his own idea on the meaning of reason.
The sense of reason also depends on to whom we refer. For Ibn Sina, reason is the distinctive human faculty that encompasses all types and different level of human reasoning, theoretically and practically. But for Descartes, reason is a subject substance (res cogitans) that is distinctively separate from an object body (res extensa) and it is employed in human subjectivism (anthropocentrism) for seeking the certainty and making a mechanistic picture of the world.
The Islamic philosophers’ conception and understanding of the intellect (al-‘aql) is greatly influenced by the descent of the Quran from the divine realm to the soul of the Prophet Muhammed. For them, the Quranic term al ‘aql is used to denote human intelligence and which is etymologically related to the meanings of “to tie” or “to bind”, signifies both that which binds man to God, as well as that which binds or limits the Absolute in the direction of creation. In relation to man, al ‘aql denotes the human intellect which is the highest and noblest faculty and the principal means by which he is bound to God or to “The Truth” or “The Real”. In relation to God, al- ‘aql denotes the Universal Intellect (al-‘aql al-kulli). Al-‘aql is the repository of God’s knowledge of all created beings.
According to Seyyed Hosen Nsr, for Islamic philosophers, al-‘aql denotes both reason (ratio-Latin) and intellect (intellectus or nous). The human intellect is capable of both ratiocination, or knowing in a mediate and inferential manner through concepts and mental representations (al-‘ilm al husuli), and intuition, or knowing in a direct and immediate way by participation or experience (al-‘ilm al-huduri). Nasr suggested to translate al-‘aql into English term as ‘intellect’ rather than reason in the term of modern thought.
2. The Core Thesis: Relationship is a Mode of Being
Let us focus on our topic. Just as the suggestion of the Pope John Paul II, we need to be open for the primordial human inquiry, namely investigation of the meaning of being. And Mulla Sadra as well as Gadamer can help us to experience, explore, uncover and explain the meaning of being. In reference to Mulla Sadra thought on the type of intelligibles, just as the concept of existence, we could categorize the term of faith and reason as ‘the secondary philosophical intelligibles” (philosophical concepts). In this regard, because relationship is a philosophical concept like the concept of being, then we could say that relationship is a mode of being. It means that the main characteristic of the issue of faith-reason relation is the way how they are related and what the nature of their relation is.
Accordingly, we should uncover the relationship between the two under the investigation of being. Their relation is not categorical but existential. As an example of investigation of the meaning of being between the two, let us suppose one proposition:“ The paper is white”
“White-ness’ is a kind of predication, attribution. There are two concepts (quiddities): ‘paper’, and ‘white’; in which paper is a subject and ‘white’ is a predicate. But, in fact, in external reality, there is only one instance. Our mind conceives two quiddities and maybe more when it perceive that one instance ( a white paper ). At this stage, we come to understand that conceptualization generates diversity and multiplicity. If we continue, we could come to draw that the modality of that proposition is possibility. Because, ‘white’ is not necessary and nor impossible for the paper. Here, we uncover the kind of relationship between the paper and ‘white-ness’, i.e., the possibility, a philosophical concept. The next stage, we could see that there is a component of the proposition which is necessary for the existence of the proposition, i.e, copula ‘is’. The copula ‘is’ serves as the soul of proposition without which there will be no any proposition. Again, we uncover something hidden to appear before our awareness. And this ‘copulative existence’ can lead us to uncover ‘substantive existence’, which is independent, and categorized as existence-in-itself.
Let us take the second example, the relation (dichotomy) of mind and body
For Descartes, mind is a substance (res cogitans) that serves as subject with independent consciousness; body is a material substance (res extensa) that has body and three dimension without consciousness. Two propositions can be made then:Mind is not body Body is not mind
When we construe both negative propositions we conceive that they are separate and independent to each other, because two propositions negate each other. But, if we arrange the proposition to be:Mind is a human faculty that …Body is a human faculty that …
We see now that they have a common ground that disappears (hidden) before, i.e., human faculty or human. Now, we terminate in the term of ‘human’, there may appear school of thought of humanism, idealism, or materialism; it depends on which faculty is more concerned.
What will be if we arrange the proposition to be:Mind is a mode of being (a kind of being that has own quiddities)Body is a mode of being ( a kind of being that has own quiddites)
Referring to Mulla Sadra’s idea about gradation of existence, through that proposition we could come to understand that mind and body are different level of existence. They have existential relation, not categorical one. It is contrary to Aristotle’s theory of hylemorphism (hyle = matter, body and morphism= form, mind).
3. Relationsip between faith-reason is not categorical but existential
According to Jawad Amuli, in reference to Mulla Sadra’s thought, faith pertains to practical reason (al-‘aql al-‘amali); reason pertains to theoretical reason (al-‘aql al-nadhari). Faith is a relation between a person and the object of his knowledge, which comes into being through an act of decision-making and thus, pertains to the practical reason. Faith is the nexus of the soul with the object of its perception ; and practical reason is the agency, which establishes this relationship.
But we have to be careful that this relationship between soul and the object of its knowledge should not be confused with the judgmental relationship of propositions that are expressed by copulas. Because, an epistemic unit is a proposition that comprises a subject and predicate and a judgmental relationship, the judgmental relationship pertains to the theoretical reason and the human will is not applicable to it. Amuli explains that although in superior levels of existence – that is, in the levels where knowledge and power have external identity – practical and theoretical reasons are different and separate from one another in the inferior levels of existence.
He outlines that there is mutual existence necessitation (al-talazum al-wujudi) between faith and reason in Islamic traditions. On the one hand, numerous traditions narrated the Holy Prophet pbuh that measure the value of piety and religious devotion of individuals in proportion to their reasonability and knowledge. “Verily fear God only those of His servants induced with knowledge”; “One’s religiosity isin proportion to one’s reason”. But, on the other hand, in the traditions, a knowledge that is not coupled with faith and practice is the subject of scorn. “The noblest knowledge is hat which is manifested in the organs and body parts”; “The worst knowledge is the one that is not implemented”
Since then, despite the absence a mutual non-existential necessitation, there is mutual existential necessitation between faith and knowledge (reason). It follows that faith is veridical only when it pertains to a real entity and is coupled with definite cognition thereof and that faith without cognition invites nothing but mischief and vice. The mutual existential necessitation between faith and reason indicates that transcendent levels of faith cannot be attained if one does not posses superior levels of cognition.
The mutual existential necessitation between faith and reason indicates also that the relationship between faith and reason is existential, not merely categorical. It means that we are required to uncover the meaning of being as well as its relationship. One of the sources of mistake or failure to overcome the problem relationship between two things, two entities, two sides in modern thought-philosophy is because they overlook to uncover the being on which all entities underlie and for which they stand. Therefore, reflection on being will be necessary to resolve the problem of relationship between two things, two concepts.
How do we uncover and unfold being continuously? I shall describe it in brief because of limited time.

E. Explanation and Uncovering: Two Dialectical Moments
Due to the fact that Mulla Sadra emphasized and was concerned very much with the principiality og being and the reality of being as a pre-ontological condition for the existence of all things, the cognition activities in grasping reality become to under two moments in continuous process: moment of explanation and that of uncovering. Mulla Sadra refers directy the very reality itself, while Gadamer is more concerned with unveiling being in the limit of human experience under historicity (particular time and place) through the hermeneutic enterprise for self-understanding. We could say that for Mulla Sadra, we are open to the reality in self-understanding for disclosure of reality, while for Gadamer, we are open to text in self-horizon for disclosure the self-understanding.
As a result, besides to appeal the process of uncovering of being through experience, Mulla Sadra can embrace activity of explanation, assessment of reality as integral part of the process of unveiling being, the very reality itself. Meanwhile, Gadamer has no explanatory epistemological account as a moment of disclosure of the reality. He is concerned exclusively with the hermeneutic enterprise as the only way to disclose the reality, which has been represented by human language.
Let us see below how the explanation on reality can be considered as disclosure of reality through perception of our mind.
The soul, through its power of creativity, and through making a model of those signals, reconstructs the ‘quiddity’ of the perceived object for itself, and substitutes it for the quiddity of that external existent. And as we know, the quiddity of every object consists of the totality of its reality, of course, without the existential effects of its external characteristics.
Accordingly, man’s perception is not in the form of the indwelling and presence of the form of external objects in the mind; rather, it is a kind of ‘creation’ that is manifested in the form of ‘emanation’ from the soul. Besides, all the previous stages of perception consist of, in fact, a series of peripheral and marginal contributions or so-called prerequisites, rather than true reasons. Therefore, knowledge cannot be separated from the knower (the unity of the knower and knowledge).
The important point in such an interpretation of sense perception is solving the problem of the correspondence of the perceived external object with perception or knowledge (subject), which is technically called the correspondence between the directly known and the indirectly known. This point is at the center of philosophy, and is considered as the basis of all sciences.
The solution to the problem of the correspondence between the outside and knowledge, or between the truth of knowledge and perception lies in the unity of the quiddity of the directly known object and the perception of the indirectly known or the subject. Mulla Sadra believes that a perception which fails to unveil the truth does not result in knowledge acquisition. Quiddity is the very external and objective reality of objects which has taken off the dress of external existence, and put on the dress of mental existence. And since the criteria for ‘unveiling’ is the very quiddity of objects, i.e., its limits and definitions, whenever we have access to the quiddity of something through acquired knowledge, we have gained the knowledge of that thing. All the primary and secondary qualities, quantities, attributes, and states of objects could be found in their quiddity, and perceived by means of the senses (the lowest level of experience of being)
As to the issue of relationship between faith and reason, based on the use of the term al-‘aql (intellect) in Islamic tradition and Mulla Sadra thought the above-mentioned, we could say that two moments of the relationship as follows:
Moment of explanation: Reason (with Faith) in Intellect for experiencing BeingMoment of uncovering: Faith (with Reason) in Intellect for experiencing Being
Both moments work together in continuous alternate process. Both moments are modes of activities for unveiling being, disclosure of the reality.
Because the application of disclosure of being is a kind of mystical experience, then it will be much helpful if we take the idea of Mehdi Hairi Yazdi in his book The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy; Knowledge by Presence (New York Press, 1992). He categorizes mystical experience along with its reflection into three (3) phases of mysticism:
1. Ineffable mysticism:The experience of mysticism that is not conceptualized in terms of public understanding, and therefore has no normal public language at all. It has a peculiar private language, which is not understandable publicly, and is called in Sufi terminology, al-shathiyyatal-sufiyyah, meaning the nonsensical expressions of mystics We cannot categorize it as a conventional form of language.
2. Introspective and reconstructive mystical thinking as the pure object language of mysticism. This is what we have agreed to call the ‘language of’ mysticism
3. Philosophical or scientific meta-mysticism that talks “about” mysticism. The term ‘irfan falls into this category (knowledge by representation, KBC). All philosophical considerations of mystical experiences must be subsumed under the category of meta-mysticism. Yazdi mentions the work o Ibn ‘Arabi as the example of introspective knowledge by representation (‘irfan) from mystical knowledge by presence.
Accordingly, if we refer to the categorization of Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi, we could bring up the dialectical moment of explanation and uncovering of faith-reason relation into triadic relation in the term of continuous process through the illuminative relationship.
First circle:1 – Diving the ocean of being (pure ineffable experience without language)2 – Language of mysticism: Uncovering moment3 - Language about mysticism: Explanation moment
Second circle:4 – Diving the ocean of being (pure ineffable experience without language)5 – Language of mysticism: Uncovering moment6 - Language about mysticism: Explanation moment